



كلية الدفاع الوطني
National Defense College

Information as an Instrument of State Power *a primer*

INFORMATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATE POWER

A Primer (2.0)

Howard Gambrill Clark, Ph.D.

Information may warrant a strategy or be a continuous supporting action or the central effort for other strategies.

If one emphasizes that the process of strategy—versus a simple course of action—accounts for differing interests of partners, competitors, and adversaries along with other internal and external friction, it behooves one to know his allies, his enemies, and his state apparatus and civil society. It would also, then, be important to ensure capable communications and appropriate flow and control of information in all domains. Thus information and intelligence may be central elements of strategy—especially that analyzed information and intelligence are estimative and that strategy must be continuously flexible as others' decisions and friction writ large will change because of or despite any initial strategic task.

Furthermore, if one considers strategy as a discipline to create power—to gain more from the initial ability and will to materialize hard power—than information may be one key aspect to getting more out of what might initially be assumed.

Some scholars and strategists maintain that power may include the 1) potential effects of mobilized hard power and 2) ability to master the realm of information and influence—sometimes together considered *métis*;¹ *zhi*;² *virtù*;³ *shi* and *jie*;⁴ sytem of stratagems; *wile*;⁵ or perhaps foresight and cunning.

At the very least many strategists and strategic leaders—not all—conclude that information is one important instrument of state power.

Sun Tzu (6th century BC)

- *War is deception. Best of all is to vanquish a foreign army without a fight.*⁶

- *...it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results.*⁷

Kautilya a.k.a. Chanakya (4th century BC advisor and scholar during the rise of Maurya Empire)

- *The arrow shot by an archer may or may not kill a single man; but skillful intrigue devised by wise men can kill even those who are in the womb.*⁸
- *[A conqueror] should infuse enthusiastic spirit among his own men and frighten his enemy's people by giving publicity to his power...*⁹
- *...the following...must be employed to win in battle: by the display of the army, by secret contrivances, by fiery spies...*¹⁰

Genghis Khan (d. 1227)

- *Winning by clever deception or cruel trickery was still winning and carried no stain on the bravery of the warriors...*¹¹
- *Terror, he realized, was best spread not by the acts of warriors, but by the pens of scribes and scholars. In an era before newspapers, the letters of the intelligentsia played a primary role in shaping public opinion, and in the conquest of central Asia, they played their role quite well on Genghis Khan's behalf. The Mongols operated a virtual propaganda machine that...spread fear wherever its words carried...*¹²
- *Increasingly, paper was the most potent weapon in Genghis Khan's arsenal.*¹³
- *...[Genghis Khan] allowed people to freely circulate the worst and most incredible stories about him and the Mongols.*¹⁴
- *The postal service ranked alongside the military in importance for the Mongols, and individual Mongols were allowed to serve in it in lieu of regular military service.*¹⁵

Niccolò Machiavelli (*The Prince* 1513)

- *Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are.*¹⁶

Thomas Hobbes (*Leviathan* 1651)

- *Reputation of power is power.*

General Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson (d. 1863)

- *Mystify, mislead, and surprise.*

General William Tecumseh Sherman (d. 1891)

- *My aim, then, was to whip the rebels, to humble their pride, to follow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dread us. Fear is the beginning of wisdom.*¹⁷

Vladimir Lenin (d. 1924)

- *...the soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy.*¹⁸

B. H. Liddell Hart (*Strategy* 1954)

- *A strategist should think in terms of paralysing, not of killing.*¹⁹
- *Even on the lower plane of warfare, a man killed is merely one man less, whereas a man unnerved is a highly infectious carrier of fear, capable of spreading an epidemic of panic.*²⁰
- *On a higher plane of warfare, the impression made on the mind of the opposing commander can nullify the whole fighting power that his troops possess.*²¹
- *And on a still higher plane, psychological pressure on the government of a country may suffice to cancel all the resources at its command so that the sword drops from a paralysed hand.*²²
- *...men easily miss what is right under their eye, that concealment can often be found in the obvious, and that in some cases the most direct approach can become the least expected—just as the art of secrecy lies in being so open about most things that the few things that matter are not even suspected to exist.*²³
- *In studying the physical aspect [of war] we must never lose sight of the psychological, and only when both are combined is the strategy truly an indirect approach, calculated to dislocate the opponent's balance.*²⁴

Ernesto Che Guevara (*Guerilla Warfare* 1961)

- *The revolutionary idea should be diffused by means of appropriate media to the greatest depth possible. This requires complete equipment and an organization.*²⁵

General Võ Nguyên Giáp (*How We Won The War* 1975)

- *We must use skillful stratagems to deceive the enemy and cause them to make a wrong assessment of our intentions. At the same time, we must quickly take advantage of and aggravate these errors in order to cause them ever greater surprises and eventually defeat them completely.*²⁶
- *Our strategic decision...became the common resolve of our entire Party, our entire people and our entire army from North to South and inspired our nation to unite as one man...*²⁷

Lawrence Freedman (*Strategy: A History* 2013)

- *...the realm of strategy is one of bargaining and persuasion as well as threats and pressure, psychological as well as physical effects, and words as well as deeds.*²⁸
- *[Odysseus, Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart, Jomini] would seek victory at a reasonable cost by means of deceptions, ruses, feints, maneuvers, speed, and a quicker wit.*²⁹

Possible shortfalls to information centric strategies:

Will: It may be difficult or impossible to force will. Any information campaign to persuade others is challenging if such campaigns are not in consonance with the will of others.

Marriage with Hard Power: Without the will to employ force—to back up information strategies that comprise implicit or explicit threats or promises—current and future information strategies may be ineffective.

Domestic Audience: Secretly gathering information about and acting deceitfully towards one's own populace may engender discontent.³⁰

Allies: If revealed to be secretly gathering information about and acting deceitfully towards an ally, the relationship with said ally and relationships with other allies may be damaged. There is risk in using other-than-forthright information gathering and informative messaging with allies.³¹

Adversary Wariness: States and non-state actors with whom there is a weak, tenuous, competitive, or adversarial relationship may be wary of deceptions and cunning at the outset. Thus information strategies may be especially challenging taking into account a vigilant or distrustful target audience.³²

Diminishing Returns: When strategic deceptions or any stratagems are materialized—when they are shown to be deceptions such as in warfare—information strategies may potentially face diminishing returns. Adversaries and allies alike may trust actions and words less and become more wary. Thus strategies

should take into account and overcome distrust from past stratagems.³³

While cunning, influence, and intelligence gathering may be force multipliers for minor powers and non-state actors—allowing them to ‘box above their weight class’—and may be helpful at the operational and tactical levels for major powers, some scholars warn that regional and world powers should use strategic information efforts sparingly. While spying and guile may be cheap and with little risk for minor powers, great powers may risk their position with a reputation of dishonesty. Such scholars propose that “Once warfare moved to mass armies with complex organizations, there would be limits to what could be achieved by means of guile. The emphasis would be on force.”³⁴

Yet others suggest that information strategy—in all its forms, open and clandestine—is essential even to regional and global powers and is sometimes perhaps a lost art in contemporary times. Regional and global powers can employ ‘asymmetric’ information strategies and learn from minor powers and historical global powers who use asymmetry to survive and grow. The Mongols under Genghis Khan are one oft used case study of a once global power employing information-centric ‘asymmetric’ strategies.

A question to consider is how effective is an information strategy with a forthright and advertised policy that is backed by later action. Would this confuse distrustful or doubting adversaries? Could this engender strategic surprise?³⁵

Terms:

Information is data obtained from observation, investigation, or study. It can be raw, unfiltered, and unevaluated. It could be unimportant, false, incomplete, or misleading.

Narrative has multiple differing definitions. Very often analysts and strategists consider four themes: 1) a **story** or set of stories, 2) an expression of **identity**, 3) storytelling that holds **meaning**

for a people especially in a time of crisis, and 4) storytelling that has a **purpose** normally to persuade.

Hybrid Warfare has no standard definition. Many consider it a blend of information, cyber, irregular/regular, and unconventional/conventional warfare. However most warfare, modern and ancient, is waged through multiple complex means—military and nonmilitary—often with information strategy as central whether intentional or not.

Some scholars conclude that the nature of war remains the same while its character changes with new weaponry and information platforms. Others argue that both the nature and character of war are largely unchanged—maintaining that technological innovation has a relatively minor impact on the theories and methods of information strategies.

Strategic Influence includes *the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or decisions by foreign target audiences that further [state] interests and objectives* (RAND 2009).

Strategic Communications may refer to the transmission and/or reception of words and/or actions in pursuit of strategic objectives. *Strategic communication is the alignment of multiple lines of operation (e.g., policy implementation, public affairs, force movement, information operations, etc.) that together generate effects to support national objectives. Strategic communication essentially means sharing meaning (communicating) in support of national objectives (strategically). This involves listening as much as transmitting, and applies not only to information, but also to physical communication—action that conveys meaning* (USSCJOC 2009).

Strategic communications may include the following pillars: - information operations, psychological operations (a sub-

discipline of information operations), public diplomacy, and public affairs.³⁶ Elements across these disciplines may aim to:

- Inform, influence (attitudes and/or behavior), and/or persuade audiences at home and/or abroad.
- Manage information coordination across government(s) or organization(s).
- Ensure that actions are themselves communicable.
- Ensure target audiences receive, understand, and/or are moved by communications.

Information Operations focus on the integration of numerous capabilities and aligning them with other lines of operation to *influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp* the ability of enemy decisions, and strategies. Information operations also protect friendly information and friendly forces. Information operations' core capabilities may include computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, operations security, public affairs, and combat camera.

Psychological Operations (a sub-discipline of information operations) convey information to adversaries to influence their decision-making and behavior. They are normally considered a force multiplier in concert with other security activities—whether full-scale war, stabilization missions, or other contingencies. Strategic psychological operations may attempt to persuade general or targeted audiences.

- **White** psychological operations products/actions are attributable to the real source, such as an official statement.
- **Grey** psychological operations have purposefully abstruse attribution—may seem to derive from any benign source or have unknown attribution.
- **Black** psychological operations products/actions purposefully appear to disseminate from a fictional or actual source concealing the identity of the true source.

Public Diplomacy aims to support a government's foreign policy aims, advance its interests, and strengthen its national

security by influencing and informing foreign populations. It also aims to improve the relationship between a government and its citizenry with other populaces. Public diplomacy may involve strategic communications, scholarly grants, cultural events, and university exchanges.

Public Affairs *engages domestic and international media to communicate timely and accurate information with the goal of furthering foreign policy and national security interests as well as broadening understanding of national values. In carrying out its mission, Public Affairs employs a wide range of media platforms, provides historical perspective, and conducts public outreach* (USDOS 2016).

Information Assurance comprises the measures to protect information networks and systems to assure 1) integrity, 2) availability, 3) authentication, 4) confidentiality, and 5) nonrepudiation (providing proof of data's origins). Competent information assurance can detect, prevent, and react after identity theft, viruses, worms, phishing attacks, unauthorized access, data manipulation, unauthorized disclosure, and more.

Cybersecurity may be considered a discipline within information assurance and focuses on the protection and defense of cyberspace from cyber-attacks. Defending against attacks that might otherwise compromise an online information network is an example.

Electronic Warfare uses focused energy (e.g. radio waves or laser light) to confuse or disable an adversary's electronics. It can also collect an enemy's radio signals or sense the radar of an incoming missile, for example.

Information Management covers the organizations, processes, and apparatus to collect, manage, store, preserve, and deliver information so that the 'right' information arrives or is available to the 'right' people at the 'right' time.

Information Collection Plan includes a procedure used to meet commanders or policymakers' information requirements through tasking any and all resources to gather and provide relevant information. *The collection plan provides a framework that collection managers use to determine and evaluate [information] needs. Then they use the plan to meet those needs—especially named information requirements (FM34-2 1994).*

Information Requirements are, in intelligence usage, those items of information regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander (JP2-01 2012, JP2.0 2013) or policymaker.

Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) comprise a commander's designated Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs) (JP2-01 2012, JP2.0 2013).

Request for Information (RFI) is a specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for information or intelligence products, distinct from standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. *An RFI leads to a production requirement, if the request can be answered with information on hand, or a collection requirement, if the request requires collection of new information. If an RFI leads to the initiation of a collection requirement, requestors of intelligence collection support should provide Specific Information Requirements (SIRs) to allow the formulation of collection requirements and the allocation of collection capabilities to satisfy them (JP2-01 2012, JP2.0 2013).*

Data Fusion synthesizes unfiltered data from disparate sources to generate meaningful information—with a view to reducing possible effects of circular reporting, redundancy, and imprecision.

Military Deception (MILDEC) comprises actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the

adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP-3-13.4 2012).

Use of MILDEC during any phase of an operation should help to mislead adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces (JP-3-13.4 2012).

The cornerstone of any deception operation is the deception story. The deception story is a scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception (JP-3-13.4 2012):

- Cause ambiguity, confusion, or misunderstanding in adversary perceptions of friendly critical information.*
- Cause the adversary to misallocate personnel, fiscal, and material resources in ways that are advantageous to the friendly force.*
- Cause the adversary to reveal strengths, dispositions, and future intentions. Condition the adversary to particular patterns of friendly behavior to induce adversary perceptions that can be exploited by the joint force.*
- Cause the adversary to waste combat power with inappropriate or delayed actions.*

Strategists may employ deception plans for offensive and defensive strategies as well as to protect their own vulnerabilities, plans, systems, hardware, information, and personnel (informal terms follow):

1. 'Fence:' A virtual or physical 'wall' is built to keep adversaries from observing something—careful not to let this fence bring unwanted attention to what is being protected. Fences may include encryption or camouflage, for example.
2. 'Fake:' Deception may include a plan to make an adversary think something else is happening—causing the adversary to misappropriate its focus, time, and energy. A fake is something normally conducted continuously over the long-term. It may change and

may include a number of deceptions. Examples may include fake databases to confuse adversaries and false ‘leaked’ information about the plans for a military campaign.

3. ‘Feint:’ As the decisive hour approaches (whether it is the beginning of an offensive military campaign or when a hacker comes near to reaching secure information) a feint confuses the adversary and draws their attention away from the target. A feint is a last-minute fake. It may be part of the fake or separate.
4. ‘Fix:’ As the decisive moment approaches, one wishes the adversary to focus their attention in the wrong direction. It fixes an enemy’s ‘eyes’ away from what is protected at the very last second.

Counter Deception contributes to situational understanding and information operations by protecting friendly command and control systems and decision makers from adversary deception (JP-3-13.4 2012).

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

A Primer (2.0)

Information / Data

Information and data are often raw, unfiltered, and unevaluated. It could be unimportant, false, incomplete, or misleading, in part or as a whole.

Intelligence

Intelligence is meaningful analysis of information. Intelligence is contextualized, vetted, and *useable* information—helps strategic leaders make decisions and informs policymakers to lead the state more effectively amidst challenges, threats, and opportunities.

Each information report that may help inform finalized intelligence is vetted by:

1. Its source (a person, for example): past reporting performance; reliability; ability to observe, internalize, communicate, and transmit; access; honesty and character writ large; professional qualifications; education; language abilities; agendas; biases; mental and emotional issues; and cognitive abilities.
2. Its information (what a person claims, for example): how does it compare with other information or intelligence, does it make sense in general, does it make sense with what we know to be true in the world and with regards to human nature, is it relevant, is it important, and what does it mean?

Focuses

Intelligence may focus on areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, intentions, influences, ideologies, narratives, psychologies, and events in the political, military, economic, security, social, infrastructure, medical, energy, and information realms. It will often also include assessments of climate and geography.

Estimative Probability

Intelligence analysts attempt to make a forthright judgment of the veracity of each report used as well as the likelihood of veracity of finished analysis. Intelligence is often predictive and contextualized amidst other intelligence and/or world affairs.

Intelligence scholar Sherman Kent suggested using “words of estimative probability” with intelligence estimates: ‘certain’ (100% that it is reliable and/or will occur), ‘almost certain’ (about 93%), ‘probable’ (about 75%), ‘chances about even’ (about 50%), ‘probably not’ (about 30%), ‘almost certainly not’ (7%), and ‘impossible’ (0%). Also commonly used are the terms ‘highly likely,’ ‘likely,’ ‘could occur,’ ‘unlikely,’ ‘highly unlikely.’

As Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap noted, “In the history of wars and revolutions, even the most accurate predictions could not anticipate adequately and truthfully, but only approximately and essentially, what would take place in reality.”³⁷


Future Adversary Courses of Action

Intelligence analysts will often try to predict—especially regarding security—an enemy’s most likely, most dangerous, and most favorable courses of action. Predictive intelligence attempts to ready strategic leaders for numerous future circumstances.

High Value Target

A High Value Target (HVT) is a person or resource that if killed/destroyed, captured, or influenced may weaken an enemy. Analysis of critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, and requirements can inform intelligence identification of recommended HVTs.

Intelligence Cycle



Intelligence Collection Plan

An organized procedure is used to meet commanders or policymakers' requirements through tasking any and all resources to gather and provide relevant information and/or finished intelligence within a specified time. *The collection plan provides a framework that collection managers use to determine and evaluate intelligence needs. Then they use the plan to meet those needs—especially named commanders or policymakers' intelligence requirements and priority intelligence requirements (FM34-2 1994).*

Intelligence Requirements

Intelligence Requirements cover any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information or the production of intelligence (JP2-01 2012, JP2.0 2013).

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) are designated by a commander or decision maker. They are critical to decision making, and to focus the intelligence system and the allocation of available intelligence capabilities...As an operation ensues, the commander updates PIRs to address new requirements or concerns, and as the situation changes, either eliminates some or develops others...Using PIRs as the basis, the intelligence staff develops the command's Essential Elements of Information (EEIs)...a subset of information requirements that are related to and would answer a PIR (JP2-01 2012, JP2.0 2013).

Request for Information (RFI) is a specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for information or intelligence products, distinct from standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. An RFI leads to a production requirement, if the request can be answered with information on hand, or a collection requirement, if the request requires collection of new information. If an RFI leads to the initiation of a collection requirement, requestors of intelligence collection support should provide Specific Information Requirements (SIRs) to allow the

formulation of collection requirements and the allocation of collection capabilities to satisfy them (JP2-01 2012, JP2.0 2013).

Collection

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) refers to the collection of information from human sources. The collection may be done clandestinely or openly via conversations, observation, or interviews. *Agent* or *asset* refers to a person that is recruited to provide information. Operations Officers, in the context of intelligence, refers to those that recruit/handle agents/assets.

Espionage is the practice of ‘spying’—to obtain information about plans and activities especially of threats, other governments, and/or competing corporations.

Tradecraft, in formal English, often refers to the techniques and procedures of espionage.

Surveillance involves carefully watching a person, thing, or location—especially to prevent a crime, incident, or adversarial attempt.

Reconnaissance *is often a military activity in which soldiers, airplanes, etc., are sent to find out information about an enemy or location (Merriam-Webster 2016).*

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) refers to electronic transmissions that can be collected.

Communications Intelligence (COMINT) is a type of SIGINT and refers to the interception of communications.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) is sometimes also referred to as photo intelligence (PHOTINT)—many platforms such as jets and satellites can provide imagery.

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) can overlay all-source intelligence upon meaningful maps and/or images.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) concerns the movement/changes and presence of people, weapons, compounds, and industrial activities, for example—tracked by an array of platforms and systems.

Document Exploitation (DOCEX) refers to the collection, translation, analysis, and exploitation of documents and media.

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) may refer to analysis derived from openly available information as well as the activity of collecting and analyzing open source data. (Most intelligence analysis derives predominantly from information openly and generally available.)

All Source Intelligence refers to intelligence that draws on an array of disparate sources.

Other Helpful Terms

Clandestine operations conceal actions.

Covert operations emphasize concealment of the identity of who is conducting the action.

Intelligence Support to Targeting aims to “find, fix, finish, exploit and analyze (F3EA) the enemy faster than it could evolve itself.” There is no evidence that this tactic helps to strategically defeat any contemporary violent extremist organization or insurgency.

Counterintelligence (CI) refers to collection, analysis, production, dissemination, exploitation, investigation, and operations to identify and protect against espionage, others’ intelligence operations, assassination, and sabotage. CI is also offensive: deceive, exploit, and disrupt the enemy actively to veil friendly vulnerabilities and intentions.

Red Teams/Cells often war-game as if they are the enemy to better analyze friendly vulnerabilities and adversarial strengths, dispositions, and compositions during exercises and plans.

Analytic Techniques

Define the problem, challenge, threat, or opportunity clearly.

Identify and define your assumptions, partisanship, emotions, and cultural/moral/religious/personal biases clearly. Challenge your assumptions continuously. Avoid assuming others think and act like you (avoid ‘mirror imaging’). Understand that another person unlikely acts completely irrationally or rationally by your standards.

Avoid target fixation—widen your analytic horizon to avoid missing events and ideas that may be relevant to analysis.

A methodology should be clear and weigh hypotheses fairly/ evenly. Weaknesses in methodology should be stated upfront and lead to a qualified, conditional, and restrictive conclusion.

Avoid solution-driven analysis (biased towards a certain action).

Avoid satisficing (picking a solution that seems easy and satisfactory and finding evidence to support it) and instead examine all hypotheses—identify those with the least inconsistent evidence. Inconsistent evidence plays a central role in the analysis phase, and consistent evidence will play a greater role for the final deliverable analytic product.

Ensure conclusions are openly qualified and conditional given the shortfalls of the methodology, sources, and information.

Encourage other analysts and agencies to challenge your analyses and avoid “group think,” whereby an analyst may not question her/his agency’s ideas, methods, biases, or assumptions.

Answer the ‘so what’ for your analysis product. Ensure it is meaningful, impactful, and useful for your particular audience.

Writing / Briefing

Be concise. Intelligence writing and briefing are often exercises in prioritization and exclusion laying bare the core of what must be communicated.

Often place the bottom line or conclusion upfront.

Some use the inverse pyramid scheme by which one writes/says the most important point first, second most important point second, and so on.

Use simple and positive language in the active voice. Avoid negatives. For example instead of “do not do this,” say “avoid this.”

Avoid using all evidence to justify a conclusion. Two or three references to evidence are often enough.

Avoid acronyms and specialized/technical/difficult words. Use plain mainstream non-expert language.

Repeat the same word as much as necessary as opposed to using inaccurate or confusing synonyms. Precision and accuracy above style always.

One line paragraphs are acceptable. Three-word sentences are fine. Starting sentences with conjunctions is fine.

Use oxford commas and every grammatical tool to reduce possible ambiguity.

Know the audience. A particular minister may only want a one-page intelligence briefing per day. Thus analyses would have to be concise.

Information / Intelligence Sharing

Continuously ask “with whom should I share this information or intelligence.” The culture should be ‘need to show’ as opposed to just ‘need to know.’

Learn the laws, techniques, and administrative steps to de/reclassify reports or release parts of reports to ensure proper information sharing with partners with different security clearance levels. Know the legal, administrative, and technology officers across agencies that can help reclassify reports or parts of reports properly.

Actively build meaningful professional relationships across varying communities—commercial, counterterrorism, multinational, tourism, nonprofit, and academic communities, for example—to widen horizons, hear creative ideas, and share information as appropriate. Trust is built over time. Trust cannot be surged during crises.

Avoid just relying on established formal interagency working groups and create your own networks.

NARRATIVE A Primer

Defining Narrative

Narrative has multiple differing definitions. Very often analysts and strategists consider one or more of the following themes:

1. A story or set of stories
2. An expression of identity—theories linking narrative and identity have been made by psychologists, psychiatrists, neuroscientists, literary scholars, historians, philosophers, and social scientists
3. Storytelling that holds or provides meaning for a people especially in a time of crisis—explaining or perhaps normalizing life for some group of people

4. Storytelling that has a purpose normally to persuade.

Narratives may be written or verbal or refer to communicable actions and/or events. They may be gathered during interviews or surveys or may be naturally occurring (observed).

The idea of narrative may differ from community to community. Thus some scholars consider narratives unique to any given location.

A narrative may reflect a community. If communities are unique, then so are their narratives' substance, style, and means of transmission. Each narrative is grounded in history, expressing a group's identity, accomplishments, challenges, ambitions, and desires. And through such narratives, communities can recognize their identity amidst outsiders and neighboring communities. During developing events—such as regional warfare, foreign incursion, and environmental disasters for example—narratives allow a community to gauge meaning and understanding. Narratives emerge without necessarily conscious design as communities continue to develop and preserve identity, sometimes inoculating societies from outside ideas and ideologies.³⁸

Master narratives may reflect and/or communicate locally deep-seated ideologies, belief systems, history, and language as no outsider can. Only locals are fluent in the visceral and logical, rational and irrational, personalized and ubiquitous messages. And only at the local level, amongst trusted colleagues, friends, relatives, and neighbors will person-to-person transmission of narratives take on intensity, emotion, and color. Through trust, recognized monuments and temples, visual motifs, and repetition will master narratives naturally travel and strengthen. Locals are the experts at local messaging.³⁹

Effective Narratives for Statecraft

Scholars and strategists disagree on what might make a strategic narrative effective in international policy and warfare. There is

unlikely a formula. However, some elements that may very well describe an effective strategic narrative may include:

Seeming Unassailability: At the emotional and intellectual level, unfolding events seem to buttress the narrative.

Certainty: A narrative that appears certain—describing ways, means, and ends as the only avenues given circumstances and ‘enough’ information—may be effective.⁴⁰

Urgency: The narrative calls for action in an immediate fashion.

Change: A goal or direction provides meaning and purpose for a people. Sometimes a change is a return to some golden age—real, partially true, or fiction—or one of liberation.

Brevity & Clarity: The shorter and clearer the master narrative the more likely it may easily translate to the local and global levels. Clarity and brevity may help dissemination in closed information systems such as North Korea, relatively free/open media areas such as some western European countries, and offline communities such as some rural Pashtun tribal areas of western Pakistan. Clarity and brevity are difficult but important. As once General Electric CEO Jack Welch stated, “You would not believe how difficult it is to be simple and clear. People are afraid that they may be seen as a simpleton. In reality, just the opposite is true.”

Concreteness: A story with concrete characters and/or effects may help to anchor a narrative in reality and perhaps allow a narrative to communicate its meaning more effectively.⁴¹

Unexpectedness: A counter-intuitive idea or one that offers a surprise may help a narrative to gain traction.⁴²

Viral Amplification: Compelling narratives may spark traditional and social media headlines. The storytelling becomes the story—virally spreading the original narrative beyond its initial audience. An example is mainstream television media reporting

on the extreme violence or impressive editing savvy of a terrorist group—perhaps unwittingly spreading the original narrative within the reporting, which necessarily describes the violent extremist organization.

Materialization: States and sub and transnational entities may wield a narrative upfront as a central effort to later materialize the story through action. For example, some Afghan Pashtun narratives of self-determination against Soviets materialized in their self-sufficiency in fighting and relative autonomy (short-lived) as an end state. Also, some governments may, for example, communicate their intent to improve livelihoods before they conduct economic development and humanitarian assistance abroad.

Smokescreen or Mirror: Narratives may hide or distort identities and intentions to trick adversaries into misappropriating resources towards false centers of gravity. Narratives may also mirror advisory misassumptions to the same end.

Pace & Lead: A messenger, when delivering a narrative through any means, may at first keep pace with sentiment and then slowly inspire a populace towards more radicalized or ‘evolved’ ideas.⁴³

Story vs. Statistics: A narrative may only persuade some audiences through convincing evidence and data. An emotive story that illustrates the narrative may be more effective with other audiences (alone or in addition to statistics).⁴⁴

Confusion: Some information strategies call for 1) volume, 2) rapidity, and 3) getting out first—along with multiple versions of the story, changing levels of falsehoods, and trolling for mass effect—to confuse targeted audiences. The aim is to lower confidence in all news outlets and obfuscate the real story and/or raise levels of doubt over any given conclusion.

Wasta: A narrative may be impactful when from the voice or pen of a person with influence—perhaps someone respected for a record of heroism, storied experience, or proven intellect and

scholarship, for example. Often such messengers are independent of outside influence—not seen as a puppet.

Credibility: A narrative may be impactful from an expert or particular witness or victim to a phenomenon. Seeming independence and lack of financial motivation may also help credibility.

Charisma: Even if a messenger is initially without *wasta*, she/he may relay influential narratives through pure charisma and inspirational spirit. For example, in 15th century France, a teenage La Pucelle d'Orléans, with no martial or leadership experience, according to popular history, may have helped to inspire successful incursions against the English army.

Deeds: A narrative may be effective when wedded to deeds, or the deeds themselves, if reported, may act as a narrative.

Analyzing Narratives

Narrative analysis assesses what is said, how it is said, the transmitter, the transmission means, and the reception of a message as well as actions that can be communicable. One can study narratives themselves or use narratives as tools to study another discipline or disciplines. All approaches may include qualitative and/or quantitative methodology. Of note is

- A story's structure: plot, use of analogy, epiphany, order of events, causalities or lack thereof, linearity or lack thereof, cognitive shifts, growth, points of view, and/or change
- The manner in which a storyteller tells the story—aside from structure—such as verbal emphasis on some ideas and physical/visual performance
- What a story means
- How a story causes an effect
- Emphasis on certain themes and what this stress means
- How structure impacts substance and vice versa

- The setting, historical backdrop, and local/regional/international context of any given story

Narratives can be ‘pulled’ or observed, and very often the elicitor/observer cannot disassociate herself/himself from impacting the narrative that she/he studies

Uses of Narrative Analysis

Narratives may perhaps help to reveal or further understand:

- Identities
- Motivations
- Prioritizations of interests and objectives
- Intensities of resolve
- Explanations of actions
- Indicators for future actions
- Historical contexts
- Popular perceptions
- Receptions of communications from information strategies

Strategists and scholars may analyze narratives to develop overlapping maps of civil society issues and indicators/predictors of future courses of actions and intents.

Considerations for Civil-Society Narrative Collection

During interviews/surveys/polls, one should consider several factors (Clark 2014):

- The safety of the researcher and respondent
- The effect that the researcher may have on the respondent
- The effect on a respondent if the respondent believes her/his stories may somehow be made public
- Biases and/or agendas of respondents
- Avoiding sampling errors and minimizing methodological weaknesses

When asking queries to hear stories through open-question interviews, surveys, or polls—when the questioner is not already a native of the area—several approaches may be considered (Clark 2014):

- Ask a local linguist to translate a question into the local language/dialect. Then ask another local linguist to translate the question back into the questioner's language/dialect to check for meaning in the target language/dialect. Bilingual linguists do not necessarily make effective interpreters and translators—translation is a discipline (art/science) learned and practiced often for decades to be effective.
- Describe your intent and general idea behind a question to one or more linguists and ask him/her/them to provide several versions in the target language. Have these versions translated back to the questioner's language/dialect to ensure accuracy and allow the questioner to choose the most effective question. This approach has merit because rarely is any question translated perfectly across languages/dialects.
- Provide versions of questions to local focus groups for their discussions and recommendations.

Also, keep in mind, when conducting or analyzing polls, surveys, and interviews in unstable regions (Clark 2014):

- More secure areas in an otherwise overall unstable country may allow people to feel that they can speak more freely to criticize foreign and local formal government representatives. Thus secure and relatively stable areas may seem to harbor the strongest grievances in some cases.
- Insecure areas may keep locals from answering questions out of fear of retribution. Those that speak in insecure areas may taper their answers out of fear of enemy or government reaction (not trusting the interviewer's assurances)—causing, perhaps, some level of social desirability bias. Thus insecure and

unstable areas may sometimes seem to harbor the fewest grievances.

- Those with access to media may speak about their opinion on their perception of their country or region writ large vice their own community independent of whether the question is about the community or not. Respondents may taint their answers with media influence.
- Operations, federal government presence, recent international events, and other outside factors may affect perceptions on security and governance. Third party activity will affect answers continuously.
- The presence of foreign militaries and formal government actors may lead to increased collateral damage and spikes in perceptions of insecurity during warfare. In other words, a new foreign presence may immediately put an area in ‘red’ with regards to the perceptions of security—the cause very well being the very entity conducting the survey.
- In warzones and amidst civil strife most civilians cannot be reached for surveys or interviews—causing skewed convenience polling.
- Villages, tribal areas, and other subnational areas often have unique ways of describing threats and challenges. Without nuanced definitions and language for each village, neighborhood, or tribal area, surveys will fail to accurately capture or portray local perceptions.
- Some respondents in some communities will answer “why,” “how did this happen,” and “what were the events that led to this” differently, revealing cultural, philosophical, cognitive, and etymological variances, leading to skewed results of poor methodology and translation.
- Closed and leading questions often lead to skewed answers in cultures in which people believe it is respectful to be agreeable—whereas open questions and discussions may be more appropriate to areas that practice rich narrative traditions.

- Independent of how a questioner introduces a survey, respondents may believe that answers could lead to development projects—especially in light of past development groups whose surveys may have eventually led to funded programs and construction. Thus answers may be tainted by personal agendas.
- Regardless of how a questioner introduces a survey in any area, respondents may believe that local and foreign governments may read answers and judge respondents. Thus answers may be tainted.

Caution and full, honest recognition of weaknesses should be given in analysis of any survey data—even when analysts only use such information to view general trends over time to incorporate into a more holistic assessment of populations.

Narrative Structure

Some writers, scholars, and strategists advise against too much emphasis on structure—some even advising to not let plot get in the way of a ‘good’ story:

- *Events at home, in school, at work, in the street, these are the bases for a story.* —Naguib Mahfouz
- *I distrust plot...* —Stephen King
- *Character is plot.* —F. Scott Fitzgerald
- *If all we care about is advancing the plot, why read novels.* —George R.R. Martin

Others believe structure to be central to narrative such as Aristotle who wrote, “The plot, then, is the first principle...”

Narrative structures may include:⁴⁵

- Three acts
 - Beginning, middle, and end
 - Setup, confrontation, resolution—sometimes called a ‘hero’s journey’
 - Act I introduces the protagonist

- Act II drives the protagonist to struggle with a challenge/threat
 - Act III comprises the hero's final efforts to overcome a challenge/threat
 - Causality is often central to this structure: each act causes/demands the next
- Linearity
 - A journey, literally and/or figuratively, from point 'A' to point 'Z'—perhaps with lessons or character changes, but not necessarily
 - A one-dimensional simple plot that leaves any story bare, unshackled to artificial structure
- Single stream
 - Storytelling relayed consecutively in real time
 - The structure does not necessarily attempt to select the most important moments
 - There may be no need to shape action because it is already shaped by time
 - Can use the march of time as a theme or device
 - The runtime/length is embedded into the drama
- Multiple timelines
 - Multiple stories are woven together emotionally and/or thematically—not necessarily causally
 - Suggests perhaps certain continuities across space and time
- Lateral
 - Multiple stories occurring perhaps simultaneously
 - Perhaps speaks to a certain interdependency or interconnectedness of the world or region
- Narration
 - Can gloss over certain sections and emphasize others
 - Can jump back and forth in time to serve the story

- Ending upfront
 - It is not necessarily about how the story ends but instead how the story gets to its conclusion
 - The end, given upfront, allows the rest of the story to be an unfolding of the answers to the mystery—perhaps the reasons for the ending even becomes unimportant to the greater narrative
 - It may emphasize the shape of the journey—how the story gets from ‘A’ → ‘Z’ and not about ‘Z’ itself
 - Focuses on the ‘how’
- Backwards
 - Begins at the end and provides the story backwards in time
 - Conceals the beginning as perhaps the main source of tension
 - Perhaps subjugates narrative to fate—the course has been set, and the ending known
 - The story provides, perhaps, a forbidding foresight
- Repetition with differences
 - May examine the same event many times with slight differences—perhaps revealing the ripple effects of slight changes of initial decisions
- Repetition from multiple points of view
 - Provides the same incident or incidents from multiple points of view
 - This structure questions the very concept of storytelling
 - Perhaps no two stories add up
 - Objectivity takes a backseat to human points of view
- Circular
 - Ends where it starts—literally, emotionally, or in some other nonliteral way

- Forces an audience to question our concepts of causality
 - May even force the audience to question whether the story exists at all
 - The story becomes about inescapable fate perhaps
 - Perhaps underlines a certain cycle—of, for example, violence begetting violence
 - Nonlinear
 - The story bends time backwards and forwards—whatever serves the story best (like narration but without a narrator)
 - Plot does not necessarily drive the story
 - Events become subservient to the story the storyteller is telling
 - Events are not necessarily explained by those that precede them
 - Causes are sometimes from deep in history
 - Illogical structures
 - Stories are connected not necessarily through logic or causal effect but perhaps by emotions, feelings, or thematic association or dissonance
 - The story itself becomes necessarily connected to the storytelling
 - Stories are affected by the inherent defects of human observation and subjectivity
 - There very well may have been some underlying logical cohesive story but it no longer exists or is no longer discernible
 - Perhaps the story provides moments and allows the audience to connect them as they wish
-

REFERENCES⁴⁶

Narrative and Communications

Aristotle, *Poetics*, Janko, R, trans. Hacket, 1987.

Bruner, J. S., *Acts of meaning*, Harvard University Press, 1990.

Casebeer, W. D. and Russell, J. A., "Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive Counter-Narrative Strategy," Naval Postgraduate School Monterrey CA, Center for Contemporary Conflict.

Cialdini Ph.D., Robert B, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, HarperCollins, 2006.

Corman, S. R., A. Trethewey, and H.L. Goodall Jr., (Eds.), *Weapons of mass persuasion: strategic communication to combat violent extremism*, New York: Peter Lang, 2008.

Heath, Chip and Dan Heath, *Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die*, Random House, New York, 2007.

Johnson, J, *Moral imagination: Implications of cognitive science for ethics*, University of Chicago Press, 1993.

Linde, C, *Life stories: The creation of coherence*, Oxford University Press, 1993.

Lloyd, G, *Being in Time: Selves and Narrators in Philosophy and Literature*, Routledge, 1993.

McAdams, D. P., and K.C. McLean, *Narrative identity*, *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 22(3), 2013.

Ricoeur, P., *Time and narrative II*, (K. McLaughlin and D. Pellauer, Trans.), University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Ricoeur, P., *Oneself as another*, (K. Blamey, Trans.), University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Schaffer, R., *Retelling a life: Narration and dialogue in psychoanalysis*, Harper Collins, 1992.

Stability Operations

U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-07, *STABILITY OPERATIONS*, 2010.

MCIP 3-33.02 (PRELIM) SSIC 03000. *MARITIME STABILITY OPERATIONS*, May 2009.

INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK, Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee (R&S PCC) along with USAID Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Forces Command, and the Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2008.

DISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK, USAID, 2010.

Foreign Internal Defense

JP3-22, *FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE*, 12 July 2012.

JP3-07.1, *JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID)*, 26 June 1996.

USSOCOM Directorate for Intelligence, *Village Stability Operations—101: Understanding USSOCOM's role in VSO and ALP in Afghanistan and Beyond*, The Donovan Review, January 2012.

Hybrid Warfare (provided by Ambassador Grigol Mgaloblishvili)

Hoffman, Frank G. *Hybrid warfare and challenges*. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2009.

Hoffman, Frank. "On not-so-new warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats." *War on the Rocks* 28 (2014).

Hoffman, Frank G. *Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars*. Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.

Kofman, Michael, and Matthew Rojansky. "„A closer look at Russia’s “Hybrid War”." *Kennan Cable* 1, no. 7 (2015).

Charap, Samuel. "The ghost of hybrid war." *Survival* 57, no. 6 (2015): 51-58.

Lasconjarias, Guillaume, and Jeffrey A. Larsen. "NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats." In *Rome, Forum Paper*, no. 24. 2015.

Gardener, H. "Hybrid Warfare: Iranian and Russian Version of Little Green Men and Contemporary Conflict." *Nato Research Paper* 123 (2015): 78-6.

Van Puyvelde, Damien. "Hybrid war—does it even exist." *NATO Review Magazine*, May 7 (2015).

Galeotti, Mark. "The ‘Gerasimov doctrine’ and Russian non-linear war." *Moscow’s Shadows* 6 (2014).

Davis, John. "Continued Evolution of Hybrid Threats." *The Three Swords Magazine* (2015).

Герасимов, В. "Ценность науки в предвидении." *Военно-промышленный курьер* 8 (2013): 476.

Popescu, Nicu. "Hybrid tactics: neither new nor only Russian." *EUISS Issue Alert* 4 (2015).

Giles, Keir, Philip Hanson, Roderic Lyne, James Nixey, James Sherr, and Andrew Wood. *The Russian Challenge*. London: Chatham House, 2015.

Gompert, David C., and Hans Binnendijk. *The Power to Coerce: Countering Adversaries Without Going to War*. Rand Corporation, 2016.

Bērziņš, Jānis. "Russia’s new generation warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy." *Policy Paper* 2 (2014): 2002-2014.

Pomerantsev, Peter. "Yes, Russia matters: Putin's guerrilla strategy." *World Affairs* 177, no. 3 (2014): 16.

Daalder, Ivo H., Michèle A. Flournoy, John Herbst, Jan Lodall, Steven Pifer, James Stavridis, Strobe Talbott, and Charles Wald. *Preserving Ukraine's Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do*. 2015.

Counterinsurgency

Joint Publication 3-24, *COUNTERINSURGENCY*, 22 November 2013

Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Justice, Department of The Treasury, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Agriculture, Department of Transportation, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDE*, January 2009.

FM3-07.22. *COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS*, October 2004.

FM3-24.2 (FM-90-8, FM7-98), *TACTICS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY*, 2009.

FM90-8, *COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS*, 29 August 1986.

British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, *COUNTERING INSURGENCY*, Army Code 71876, October 2009.

SSIC 05000 General Admin & Management, *ON THE GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PRACTICE*.

SSIC 05000 2012 General Admin & Management, *WAR, WILL AND WARLORDS—COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN*, 2001-2011.

Counterterrorism

JP 3-26, *COUNTERTERRORISM*, 13 November 2009.

FM3037.2, *ANTITERRORISM*, February 2011.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM MANUAL, 2011.

US Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1, *A MILITARY GUIDE TO TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY*, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity, Threats Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 15 August 2007.

Unconventional, Irregular, Guerrilla, and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare

Boot, Max, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, Liveright Publishing Corporation, New York, 2013.

Tse-tung, Mao, *On Guerilla Warfare*, Samuel B Griffith (translator), Praeger Publishing 1961, BN Publishing 2007.

Guevara, Ernesto Che, *Guerrilla Warfare*, written in 1961, printed from “Made in the USA,” Middletown, DE, 25 June 2015.

Tanham, George K., *Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to the Viet Cong*, PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era, Praeger Security International, Westport, Connecticut, 1961.

Joint Publication 3-05, *SPECIAL OPERATIONS*, 16 July 2014.

FMFRP12-15 USMC, *SMALL WARS MANUAL*, 1990.

FM 3-05.130, *ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE*, September 2008.

FM3-05.201, *SPECIAL FORCES UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS*, April 2003.

TC18-01, *SPECIAL FORCES UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE*, November 2010.

JSOU, *SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES REFERENCE MANUAL Second Edition*, August 2008.

U.S. Marine Corps, *LESSONS FROM YESTERDAY'S OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR: NICARAGUA AND THE SMALL WARS MANUAL*, 1996.

FM31-21 Department of the Army Field Manual, *GUERRILLA WARFARE AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS*, 29 September 1961.

Strategic Services Field Manual No. 4, *SPECIAL OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL – STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)*, Office of Strategic Services, 23 February 1944.

U.S. Marine Corps, *SMALL WARS MANUAL*, 1940.

Sullivan Jr., Major John P., *The Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual and Colonel C.E. Callwell's Small Wars – Relevant to the Twenty-First Century or Irrelevant Anachronisms?* USMC 1896.

FM3-05.230, *SPECIAL FORCES TACTICAL FACILITIES*, February 2009.

Kent, Captain Rory D., *THE SMALL WARS MANUAL AND COUNTERINSURGENCY*, USMC 1996.

U.S. DOD, *JOC IW Version 1.0*, 11 September 2007.

Civil Affairs

SSIC 05000 General Admin & Management, U.S. MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS IN I CORPS REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM APRIL 1966 – APRIL 1967, 1970.

NAVMC 2500 SSIC 05000 General Admin & Management (NAVMC) Current, JOINT MANUAL FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS, 1966.

Psychological Operations

Curtis, Glenn, *An Overview of Psychological Operations (SYOP)*, Library of Congress Federal Research Division prepared under an Interagency Agreement, October 1989.

Narula, Sumil, “Psychological Operations (PSYOPs): A Conceptual Overview” in *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2004.

FM3-05.301, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PROCESS TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES, 30 August 2007.

FM3-05.302, TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (INCL C1), 28 October 2005.

FM3-05.302 CHG 1, CHANGE 1 TO FM 3-05.302, 6 August 2008.

FM3-53, MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS (INCL C1), 4 January 2013.

Intelligence

JP2-01, *JOINT AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS*, 5 January 2012.

JP2.0, *JOINT INTELLIGENCE*, 22 October 2013.

MCWP2-1, *INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS*, 2013.

ADRP2-0, *INTELLIGENCE*, 31 August 2012.

ATP2-22.9, *OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE*, 10 July 2012.

ATP2-33.4, *INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS*, 18 August 2014.

FM2-01.3, *INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD/BATTLESPACE (INCL C1 AND C2)*, 15 October 2009.

TC2-91.7, *INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS*, 26 January 2011.

¹ See: Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, chapter 4.

² See: Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, chapter 4.

³ See: Machiavelli, Niccolo, *The Prince*, translated by Luigi Ricci, Oxford University Press, 1935.

⁴ Meaning espionage and deception. See: Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

⁵ See: Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*; Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 64 – 65.

⁶ See: Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

⁷ See: Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

⁸ Chanakya, Kautilya, *Kautilya's Arthashastra*, translated by R. Shamasastri, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016, p. 540.

⁹ Chanakya, Kautilya, *Kautilya's Arthashastra*, translated by R. Shamasastri, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016, p. 563.

¹⁰ Chanakya, Kautilya, *Kautilya's Arthashastra*, translated by R. Shamasastri, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016, p. 540.

¹¹ Weatherford, Jack, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2004, p. 91

Also see: *The Secret History of the Mongols: The Life and Times of Chinggis Khan*, translated, edited, and with an introduction by Urgunge Onon, Routledge Curzon, London, 2001; *The Secret History of the Mongols: A saga of epic battles, betrayal, love, tyrants and prisoners in Ancient China*, translated and introduced by Arthur Waley, House of Stratus, Cornwall, 2002.

¹² Weatherford, Jack, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2004, p. 114.

¹³ Weatherford, Jack, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2004, p. 114.

¹⁴ Weatherford, Jack, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2004, p. 114.

¹⁵ Weatherford, Jack, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*, Three Rivers Press, New York, 2004, p. 72.

¹⁶ See: Machiavelli, Niccolo, *The Prince*, translated by Luigi Ricci, Oxford University Press, 1935.

-
- ¹⁷ See: Sherman, General William Tecumseh, *Memoirs of General William Tecumseh Sherman*, Penguin Classics, 2000.
- ¹⁸ Hart, B. H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1954, p. 208.
- ¹⁹ Hart, B. H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1954, p. 212.
- ²⁰ Hart, B. H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1954, p. 212.
- ²¹ Hart, B. H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1954, p. 212.
- ²² Hart, B. H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1954, p. 212.
- ²³ Hart, B. H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1954, p. 208.
- ²⁴ Hart, B. H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1954, p. 327.
- ²⁵ Guevara, Ernesto Che, *Guerrilla Warfare*, written in 1961, printed from “Made in the USA,” Middletown, DE, 25 June 2015, p. 37 – 38.
- ²⁶ Giap, General Vo Nguyen and General Van Tien Dun, *How We Won The War*, originally written/published 1975 in the *Vietnam Courier* of August/September 1975, RECOM Publications, Philadelphia, 1976, p. 54.
- ²⁷ Giap, General Vo Nguyen and General Van Tien Dun, *How We Won The War*, originally written/published 1975 in the *Vietnam Courier* of August/September 1975, RECOM Publications, Philadelphia, 1976, p. 31.
- ²⁸ Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. xii.
- ²⁹ Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. xii.
- ³⁰ Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, chapter 65.
- ³¹ Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, chapter 65.
- ³² Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, chapter 65.
- ³³ Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, chapter 65.
- ³⁴ Freedman, Lawrence, *Strategy: A History*, Oxford University Press, 2013, chapter 65.
- ³⁵ Hart, B. H. Liddell, *Strategy*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1954, p. 208.
- ³⁶ Cornish, Paul, Julian Lindley-French, Claire Yorke, “Strategic Communications and National Strategy,” Chatham House Report, 2011.
- ³⁷ Giap, General Vo Nguyen and General Van Tien Dun, *How We Won The War*, originally written/published 1975 in the *Vietnam Courier* of August/September 1975, RECOM Publications, Philadelphia, 1976, p. 28.
- ³⁸ Clark, Howard Gambrill, *Lions of Marjah*, Thesis for King’s College London, 2014.
- ³⁹ Clark, Howard Gambrill, *Lions of Marjah*, Thesis for King’s College London, 2014.
- ⁴⁰ Mycoskie, Blake, “How to tell a story that sparks a movement,” Marketing & Communication, 26 October 2016.
- ⁴¹ See: Heath, Chip and Dan Heath, *Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die*, Random House, New York, 2007; Cialdini Ph.D., Robert B, *Influence*:

The Psychology of Persuasion, HaperCollins, 2006; Barron, David R., and Danek S. Kraus, *Power Persuasion*, Robert Reed Publishers, 2010.

⁴² See: Heath, Chip and Dan Heath, *Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die*, Random House, New York, 2007.

⁴³ See: Heath, Chip and Dan Heath, *Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die*, Random House, New York, 2007; Cialdini Ph.D., Robert B, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, HaperCollins, 2006; Barron, David R., and Danek S. Kraus, *Power Persuasion*, Robert Reed Publishers, 2010.

⁴⁴ Dobelli, Rolf, *The Art of Thinking Creatively*, translated by Nicky Griffin, HarperCollins, New York, 260 – 262.

⁴⁵ See: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, “Narrative Analysis Definition,” Qualitative Research Guidelines Project, qualres.org, accessed 6 November 2016; Fritz, Katherine, “Case Study & Narrative Analysis: Qualitative Data Analysis” briefing, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2008; Cinefix, “10 Best Structured Movies of All Time,”

<https://youtu.be/mgk6e8gWDbk>, 16 August 2016; Bamberg, Michael, “Chapter 6: Narrative Analysis,” APA Handbook of Research Methods in Psychology: Vol. 2. Quantitative, Qualitative, Neuropsychological, and Biological, editor-in-chief H. Cooper, American Psychological Association, 2012.

⁴⁶ Primarily, see LOC, USCO ECO 1-4290425701, 20161228



كلية الدفاع الوطني
National Defense College